Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden 
Introduction
Social media has exploded in the last decade, providing an immense amount of information about people and places across the globe through status messages and user profiles.
Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) is a sub-set of open source intelligence (OSINT). OSINT has existed for an extended period of time, but it is a relatively new source of intelligence for the Army. 1 There are approximately 3.1 billion people accessing the Internet today. 2 These people interact in a multitude of ways, but only over the last decade have social media sites online served to consolidate the thoughts of many in one place. These networks provide a source that aggregates personal information with network connections over time. Consolidation of personal information, network connections, and multiple reports (status messages) over time present a unique opportunity for military forces to change how they currently collect and process information about the population within the operational environment.
This monograph started with the idea that social media could provide insight into the population's wants, needs, and desires. While this may be true, the investigation of the topic identified a larger barrier to understanding for military forces, the role of intermediaries. History, theory, and doctrine identify a need to understand the people in the environment, but the problems of collection and processing have made them a necessary evil. As a result, this paper evolved to address the problems of using intermediaries to understand the population and how SOCMINT can provide a means for eliminating the bias of intermediaries in the operational environment while addressing the historical issues of collection and processing.
The question that this monograph attempts to answer is whether military forces can use the wealth of information on social media platforms to better understand the people within the operational environment. Through research and analysis, the author determined that there are two problems to understanding the population. The first is the problem of collecting information, and the second is processing that information into meaningful intelligence. To solve these problems, military forces have used intermediaries to collect information from the population, and process that information into something that military forces can use to make decisions. Unfortunately, the use of intermediaries presents a third problem, bias.
The purpose of this monograph is to examine the current problems of intermediary bias, collection, processing, and how SOCMINT can improve understanding of the human climate within the operational environment. This monograph proposes that international relations theory describes the presence of bias in intermediaries and that SOCMINT can eliminate that bias by minimizing the roles of intermediaries while addressing the problems of collection and processing to provide military forces a better understanding of the population.
Key Terms
There are few key terms that deserve defining before moving into the rest of the paper.
They are: intermediary, SOCMINT, population in the operational environment, and international relations theory. These terms are used throughout the paper and the following definitions will assist in understanding the problem and potential solution of using SOCMINT to overcome intermediary bias.
Intermediary
Intermediaries are those people that military forces interact with in order to gain understanding about things that they cannot access directly. In the case of this paper, they are the people that represent the wants, needs, and desires of a sub-set of people in the operational environment. Instead of providing raw data from individuals, intermediaries provide a summary of many people's opinions in a format that military forces can use to make decisions. Host-nation government officials, business leaders, religious authorities, and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) sources, are all examples of intermediaries that summarize raw data about the population and present information to military forces.
SOCMINT
Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) is intelligence derived from the collection and analysis of information from social media platforms. It is a subset of Open source Intelligence (OSINT) in that the information is public and unclassified. In this paper, SOCMINT is used to describe the raw data present on social media platforms, the methods for analyzing that information, and the resulting intelligence derived from analysis.
Population in the Operational Environment
Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-0 describes the operational environment as "a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander." 3 In this paper, the population in the operational environment describes the people (not the threat) that exist in the composite environment described by ADP 3-0.
International Relations Theory
International relations theories attempt to describe a complex system as it is and how it should be in the future. Though most of these theories are developed based on how nations should and do interact on a global stage, when abstracted, they describe how and why people interact the way they do within a given system. This monograph utilizes international relations theory to describe the interaction between military forces, intermediaries and the population within an operational environment. In particular, it describes the interactions of military forces with intermediaries, and how those intermediaries allow bias to shape the information they provide to military forces in the operational environment.
Human Climate
In this monograph, the human climate describes a current assessment of the wants, needs, and desires of a population in the operational environment.
Structure Of The Paper
The paper has three chapters. Chapter 1 conducts a literature review, examining why the population is important, the distinction between culture and climate, and the current methods of understanding the climate of the population in the operational environment. Chapter 2 analyzes the presence of bias in intermediaries using international relations theory. Chapter 3 proposes how SOCMINT can overcome the bias present in intermediaries by minimizing their role and providing a framework for collecting and analyzing information about the population through the use of social media.
Chapter 1: Literature Review
This literature review will look at three things. First, it will examine the impact of the population on military operations through history, theory, and doctrine. Next, it will review the value of understanding the climate in the operational environment. Last, it will describe the current methods of collecting information about the human climate and why they are inadequate.
Why the Population is Important In Warfare
Introduction to the Impact of the Population on Military Operations.
Historically, warfare has been either enemy or terrain focused. Through the experiences gained in the recent conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan, the concept of population focused, or population-centric warfare, has gained support as an additional focus in war. History, theory, and doctrine support this interest and have identified a need for military forces to understand the population in conflict as an important part of planning and executing operations. Historically, the population has always played a role in conflict in both conventional and unconventional warfare.
Theoretically, the population is important in warfare because of its impact on military operations, and global trends indicate that this impact will only increase in future conflicts. Doctrinally, US Army publications have incorporated this importance into their current advisement of operations.
Population-centric warfare has gained in popularity over the last ten years because of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but the population has always been a key component in warfare as part of understanding the operational environment.
Historical Impact of the Population
The population has long been important in counterinsurgency warfare (COIN objectives. Because of the French experience in Indochina, David Galula believed that active participation by the population was necessary for the success of an insurgency. 6 In Indonesia, the enemy was more rural than it was in Algeria, but the enemy still relied on the population for supplies and intelligence support. Whether the opposing forces are urban or rural based, the population remains an important factor for opposing forces in the conflict. As a result, the population also becomes the focus of the counter-insurgent as they attempt to isolate the population from the insurgent. Though the population may be the focus in COIN warfare, it also has a significant historic role in conventional warfare. security, basic public services, and 400,000 unemployed former Iraqi service members.
9 Each of these examples could be described as unconventional warfare, but they demonstrate that because of success in conventional warfare, and a failure to address the concerns of a population, a military can become involved in unconventional warfare.
Theoretical Impact of the Population
In addition to the historical impact, theorists too have identified the importance of the population in war and how it can have an impact on the overall success of military operations.
Clausewitz' famous trinity of war speaks of war being made up of chance, reason, and passion, and that people represent the national passion for war. 10 As nations go to war, the passion of the people is ignited in order to mobilize the men and resources necessary for large scale Napoleonic warfare. The impact of igniting that passion is that the will of the people and their opinion on warfare indicates that the will of the people is an essential part to understanding and defeating an opponent in warfare.
During the debate over the role of Air Power in industrial warfare, Gulio Douhet, argued that since industrial warfare required mobilization of an entire nation, that there was no longer any distinction between combatants and non-combatants. 11 For a nation to win in industrial-style war, the will of the people to support war should be shaped through strategic bombing attacks on population centers and the industrial production base. Each of these theorists describes how the population's wants, needs, and desire affect conflict. To mobilize a nation, a government must inflame and maintain a passion for the war by its people. During the war, opposing forces are not only trying to defeat a military opponent, but they are trying to suppress domestic support for the war or attempting to ignite a counternarrative against the war within the opposing nation. Post conflict, during reconstruction, military forces must pursue the support of the population and smother the "smoldering embers" of national passion to resist occupying forces. 14 Throughout the entirety of war, the population's passion for the conflict needs to remain a chief concern to military forces. Applying cultural understanding to military activities, cultural training provides an understanding by describing the values, beliefs, experiences, and norms within a population.
Doctrinal Impact of the Population
Culture provides the context for understanding the population in an operational environment.
Developing assessment methods to measure the climate helps military forces understand why a population is acting the way they are during a specific period. Culture and climate represent the two halves necessary for gaining a complete understanding of a population within the operational environment. The next section will discuss why current doctrine is insufficient to gain an understanding of the climate. The top third of this diagram describes using Civil Reconnaissance as a key part of understanding the operational environment. Civil Reconnaissance "is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of those specific civil aspects of the environment." 26 Through Civil Reconnaissance, commanders could use surveys and key leader engagements to complete databases used and collaboration could leverage in the assessments of other organizations to gain understanding. Unfortunately, this process has significant challenges.
Current Methods of Understanding the Population in Military
The largest obstacles to the effective use of the CIM to assess the climate is that the Civil Affairs team at the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) level is too small to effectively sift through all potentially valuable data. CIM Cells are the hub for analyzing all the information collected at through the CIM process. These are only located at the divisional level and above. At the 26 Ibid., 1-10. divisional level, this team consists of four to five civil affairs personnel. In comparison, the Division Analysis Collection Element (ACE), which manages the IPB process, has more than 200 soldiers working on analysis. The severe shortage of labor to read and fuse the information gathered through the CIM is just one of the problems with using this process to understand the climate. The next chapter will address how military forces currently use intermediaries to overcome the problems with collection and processing to understand the human climate.
Chapter 2: Analysis of Intermediary Bias
The Role of Intermediaries in Understanding the Human Climate Before diving into the problems with using intermediaries, it is necessary to understand why military forces use them. For the purpose of this monograph, intermediaries are people who represent the population for military forces and are synonymous with the term Key Leaders. Key Leaders are influential people familiar with the complex human terrain of the environment.
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Intermediaries are necessary in understanding the population because they solve two important problems for military forces when understanding the climate of the population. These problems are issues that military forces have with collecting the data from the population and the second is processing that data to gain understanding. Collection problems stem from the ability to access the data, to collect the wants, needs, and desires of the population. To do so without intermediaries would require military forces to conduct individual surveys. Conducting individual surveys is a problem of distance, time, and manpower. At the peak of the Iraq War in 2008, US troops numbered 157,800.
28 Of this 157,800, many of these soldiers were in administrative and combat support roles, so the number available to conduct surveys was much lower. In comparison, the population of Iraq was over thirty-two million spread over 438,000 square kilometers. 29 Even if all soldiers in Iraq surveyed twenty-four hours a day, there was no way to collect that volume of data while maintaining current data. Additionally, military forces were less likely to speak the language of the population, making collecting surveys subject to availability of interpreters. The issues of scale and language barriers were why the concept of using surveys was impractical for military forces to collect data directly from the population.
The second reason why military forces use intermediaries to understand the population is because they have the capacity to process the raw data. If military forces were able to collect extensive surveys on a large range of topics on a continual basis, this data is useless unless it is processed into meaningful data. The two information processes that the military currently uses, CIM and IPB, would quickly become overburdened by the volume of climate data directly collected from the population due to constraints of manpower, time, and competing demands.
Rather than expending great resources and over taxing existing processes, military forces use intermediaries to collect climate information from within their support base and to process that information into something that coalition forces can understand and use to make decisions.
Using intermediaries enables commanders to establish "productive relationships" with those that best understand the complex human terrain. 30 Currently, intermediaries are the most effective way for military commanders to understand the climate within the operational environment, but there are problems with using intermediaries. The next chapter will address the problems associated with using intermediaries to understand the climate.
Problems With Using Intermediaries

Introduction to the Problems of Using Intermediaries
If the goal of military forces is to influence the population, then it is necessary for military forces to understand the needs, wants, and desires so that the military forces can design an appropriate operational approach to influence the people. At the center of the discussion are the issues with using intermediaries as a way to measure the human climate. Intermediaries can, and do, shape the narratives of the population's want, needs, and desires in a way that distorts the truth. As a result of using intermediaries, it is impossible to gain a clear understanding of the population and thus any operational approach is developed on a weak foundation.
Looking at the operational environment as a complex system, the environment consists of a hierarchy of nested sets of sub-systems, "each embraced by those at the next higher level and embracing those at all lower levels. 31 " Within this complex system, intermediaries act in accordance with operating in two different roles. The first is as an agent, and the second is as a meta-agent. Agents are singular entities that operate based on a combination of ideology and internal models. Meta-agents are entities that are made up of many different sub-agents and operate based on the need to balance interests between their sub-agents, based on their institutional formation, and the nature with which they interact with other agents according to a two-level game. Intermediaries shape the narrative about the populations wants, needs, and desires due to bias that comes from their dual roles of an agent and meta-agent. First this chapter will examine the source of intermediary as agents and then as meta-agents. First, intermediaries derive bias from their role as an individual agent within the complex system that is the operational environment. Agents as singular entities interact with other agents based on five concepts: internal models, ideology, institutionalism, the principle-agent relationship, and use of level one and level two systems of decision making. These concepts are a source of bias for the agent and can affect how that agent acts within the environment. For the intermediary, these concepts shape the narrative that they present to military forces about the human climate as an individual agent in the operational environment.
Intermediaries as Agents
Internal Models
Internal models create bias for agents because it affects how they view the larger system and how other agents operate within the system. If ideology defines the agent, both in a descriptive and prescriptive manner, internal models present how intermediaries and other agents operate in the operational environment. Each agent in the system has an internal model that describes how the agent should act in the system within which they operate. 32 There are essentially three models that agents use to describe how they will interact with each other to best serve their individual interests. These models are realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Within each of these internal models there are many nuances, but for the purpose of this paper, only the overarching theories are described. Realism describes the system as chaos and that everyone in the system acts according to their own interests. This leads to agents cooperating only when it serves their needs and then abandoning others when the cooperation does not serve its own interests. Liberalism also views the system as chaos, but its own interests are best served by cooperating with like-minded agents to bring order to the system. Each of these theories about the system shapes how that agent will act. In the operational environment, intermediaries will interact with military forces and other intermediaries based on these three theories. Some will use a realist perspective and only interact according to their own interests. Others will attempt to serve their interest through cooperation for a vision of how the operational environment should look. Yet others will act based on the individual relationships built with the other agents within the operational environment. Military forces must understand how intermediaries view the system and how that view may shape the accuracy that intermediaries use to describe the human climate. Of these three views, the concept of ideology for the intermediary plays a key role in how the intermediary interacts with military forces.
Ideology
Bias for agents comes from ideology because it affects how the agent views itself within the system. Ideology is a body of doctrine, beliefs, and myths that an agent has based on an agent's history. 36 This historical perspective of identity defines the agent in both a descriptive and prescriptive role. In a descriptive role, it tells the story of who the agent is and how it came into 34 Ibid. being in the system. Wars, religion, and past interactions with other agents serve as a way to describe the agent as it is today. In addition to being descriptive of the agent's identity, ideology prescribes the vision for how the agent views the system. Essentially it prescribes the vision that the agent has for the system in which it operates. Since ideology is rooted in history, the agent's future actions are merely additional steps along a historical timeline. Past actions, and the lessons learned from those actions, have allowed the agent to reach its current position and future actions will continue on a similar path. Agents will not act significantly from how they have in the past because acting in a manner that counters an agent's ideology creates an identity crisis for the agent. The identity crisis comes from the agent not being able to mentally reconcile its actions with the way that it defines itself based on the actions that led to its current position. When using intermediaries, military forces need to understand how the intermediary rose to their current position. The intermediaries' identity will prescribe how the intermediary will act in the future.
With regard to communicating the climate of the population, the intermediary is unlikely to share opinions from the population that counter its own view of the operational environment based on internal bias. Sharing such opinions would threaten its identity and vision for how the operational environment should look. As a result of this, intermediaries will shape the narrative of the human climate in a way that conforms to its own ideology. Part of what shapes that narrative is a result of the intuitionalism inherent to the intermediary itself.
Institutionalism
Intermediaries act according with the institution that places them in power. In the discussion of intermediaries as meta-agents this paper will address the existing power structures that emplace them as intermediaries, this section will address the issues of the intermediary as an institution and how the intermediary will act as an institution of power. Institutionalism describes how institutions are created as a result of habitualized interaction. 37 This habitualized interaction automates decision-making for members of the institution to open space for innovation and deliberation on a multitude of issues. 38 The problem that institutionalization presents is that once the institutions are created, they begin to operate according to the institutional interests and not always in accordance with the members that created the institution in the first place. Once an institution is created in a complex environment, the institution has an interest to preserve itself within the environment and will attempt to shape the narrative in the best way that supports the institution. Narrative shaping happens in two ways: horizontally and vertically. Horizontally, the institution, as an agent, attempts to legitimize its existence by convincing all the other institutions with which it interacts with that the existence of the institution make sense. Working describes how much agents support the principle. Shirking describes how much agents attempt to limit their responsibilities to the level at which they are monitored by the principle. At the heart of this issue are the contracts that the agent has between the interests of the agent and its own self-interests. Members of the intermediaries' constituency invent the intermediary, contracting it to protect the members' interests. 42 Military forces also contract the intermediary to delegate understanding of the climate of the population. 43 Due to the tension between the interests that established the intermediary as a power broker and supporting the interests of the contract with military forces as an intermediary to understanding the population, the accuracy of information that the intermediary provides to military forces is called into question. Potentially, the intermediary could work for the principle (military forces), providing the maximum transparency to the principle and acting according to the principle's interests.
In contrast to working, the intermediary could be acting in a shirking model, and only operating to the extent that military forces monitor their actions within the operational environment. forces. The ambiguity associated with the accuracy of information will shape military force actions to address the human climate in relation to how much military forces believe the information that intermediaries present to the military forces as a result of the shirking and working dynamic between the principle and the agent. The next section will address intermediaries decision-making in the operational environment.
Level-one and level-two decision-making processes
Intermediaries share information with military forces about the human climate through two decision-making processes: level one and level two systems. Military forces often assume that intermediaries decide what they share as the result of a rational process, but there are two processes that intermediaries use. System level one strategies draw on the intermediary's abilities to read the current situation and make a quick decision based on that reading and the intermediary's history. A system-level one strategy to thinking describes decision-making as the result of instinctual thinking. 44 This instinctual thinking affects what and how agents share information with military forces. System level two decision-making is a rational process in which intermediaries weigh the different options and balance that against the interest of themselves and the interests of constituents to arrive at the optimal outcome. 45 Unfortunately, the more rational level two system of decision-making is only used when decisions represent a significant anomaly to the system level one decision-making process that requires an intermediary to perform a more rational analysis of the situation and make a rational decision. 46 As a result of these two decision- human climate is the result of rational decisions. The intuitive decision-making process is hampered to the extent that the decision fits into the existing paradigm of the intermediary.
Conclusion to the roles of intermediaries as agents
Due to the intermediaries' role as an agent, the narrative of the human climate is shaped through multiple ways. First, the intermediary has an internal model for how they view the system and will act in the system based on a realist, liberalist, or constructivist internal model.
Second, intermediaries will act as a consequence of their ideology, which describes their role in the operational environment and prescribes a vision for how the intermediary will act in the future. Third, intermediaries as institutions act horizontally with military forces and vertically with their supporting members in a manner that preserves the institution that emplaces them as intermediaries in the operational environment. Fourth, intermediaries act as agents within a principle-agent relationship with military forces and will shape the narrative they present to military forces based on the extent that they work in alignment with military force interests, or shirk their responsibility to provide accurate information in order to protect their own interests.
Fifth, intermediaries share information about the human climate through two-decision making processes. Often decisions about what to share are the result of instinctual decision-making and not based on rational analysis. All of these issues highlight the problems associated with using intermediaries as agents to understand the human climate. The next section will address the problems of intermediaries as meta-agents.
Intermediaries as Meta-Agents
In addition to the role of intermediaries play as agents, intermediaries also derive bias from their role as meta-agents in the complex system within the operational environment. As meta-agents in the environment, intermediaries represent their respective constituencies to military forces as a way to understand the human climate. Due to their role as meta-agents, intermediaries shape the information that they present to military forces as a result of how they became intermediaries, their requirement to balance interests, and the two level game that they play with their constituencies as they interact with military forces. This bias distorts a clear understanding of the human climate within the operational environment.
The creation of meta-agents post conflict meta-agent. One of the ways that the meta-agent can present the opinions of their subordinate constituencies is through the balance of interests and thus resulting in an overall policy that represents all subordinate constituencies. Within meta-agents, there will be a difference of perspectives, opinions, and interests that will shape how the meta-agent interacts with other agents. 52 The balance of interests describes the performance of meta-agents as a result of understanding the interests of the subordinate constituencies and balancing those interests into a uniform policy. By balancing the interests of subordinate agents, meta-agents are subject to the level of influence that subordinate agents have on the resulting policy. In the case of intermediaries, the bias and influence of the supporting sub-agents manifests in how intermediaries communicate the human climate. Intermediaries communicate with military forces through a lens that filters the needs, wants, and desires of their population through the ability of the subordinate agents to effectively influence the agendas of intermediary in the balance of interests. This balancing of interests represents an opportunity for sub-agent bias to manifest itself in the meta-agents actions as they interact with military forces.
Two-level games
As meta-agents, intermediaries represent several different sub-agents and sub-agendas. In addition to the issues of balancing interests, the intermediary must also play the role of negotiator between constituents and military forces. Tension between the intermediary role as an individual and the agendas of sub-agents, shapes the narrative through a two-level game. The two-level game describes that interaction between level the one actor and level two actors. Intermediaries as level one agents must negotiate with the military forces, but then they must validate those negotiations within their own power base to gain buy in to that the outcome of negotiation. the sub-agent level, internal groups attempt to pursue their interests by pressuring the intermediary to adopt policies favorable to them. 54 These intermediaries then attempt to maximize their own abilities to satisfy the needs of their constituents while minimizing the adversarial consequences of interacting with other agents in the system. 55 Intermediaries bargain with military forces over the information they will provide about the population and then must have separate discussions with constituents about whether they will provide that information.
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The tension between what subordinate interests allow and what intermediaries can effectively negotiate with military forces in accurately describing the human climate is defined as a win-set.
Win-sets define the all the possibilities that intermediaries as level one agents can present to military forces that is in accordance with the interests of their sub-agents. 57 With respect to the human climate, this represents only a small portion of all possibilities to understand the population in the operational environment constrained by the interests of sub-agents within the operational environment.
Conclusions of Intermediaries as meta-agents
Due to the intermediaries' role as a meta-agent, the narrative of the human climate is again shaped through multiple ways. First the description of the population is shaped by the existing power structure. Military forces choose to interact with intermediaries because of that existing power structure that created the intermediary, and as such, they propagate existing narratives that reinforce the reasons that the conflict started in the first place instead of a current narrative about the human climate. Second, intermediaries must balance the interests of multiple 54 Ibid., 434.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., 436.
57 Ibid., 437.
sub-agents in accordance with the influence that those sub-agents have on the intermediary. This leads to a perspective of the human climate by military forces shaped through existing interests within the intermediary as a meta-agent. Lastly, the information presented to military forces is the result of a two-level game that intermediaries play as meta-agents between the desires of military forces for state building and what subordinate interests will allow.
Conclusion for the Problems of Using Intermediaries
The use of intermediaries by military forces presents multiple problems. These problems come from the role that intermediaries must play within a complex system. Intermediaries act as both agents and meta-agents. As agents, the information they provide is subject to the filters that unitary agents have when interacting with the system. They are subject to shaping narratives about the human climate as a result of internal models, ideology, institutionalism, the principleagent relationship, and their decision-making processes. Added to the issues of acting as an agent, intermediaries also act as meta-agents that utilize the existing power structures and narratives that led to the conflict, must balance the interests and agendas of their sub agents, and play a two level game of negotiation over the sharing of accurate information with military forces. Within the meta-agent paradigm, all of the subordinate agents are subject to the same bias of agency that intermediaries are as agents themselves. Intermediaries solve the problems of collection and processing for military forces by taking on that responsibility. This means that these intermediaries also struggle with the problems of collection and often have sub-intermediaries take on the responsibility for collection and processing information about a smaller section of the population. It is a span of control issue. Span of control describes the number of individuals that a command directly manages. 58 In the Army, a division commander has over ten thousand soldiers under his command. These are too many soldiers for a division commander to directly control, so 58 Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, Mission Command, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 2-101. division commanders use intermediaries, brigade, battalion, and company commanders to manage individuals within the division overall. This limits his span of control to only a handful of brigade commanders. Intermediaries do the same thing in the operational environment. Provincially governors use district representatives, who rely on mayors, who rely on neighborhood counsels who actually interact with the population to gain an understanding of the province as a whole. For all of the sources of bias that intermediaries have as agents and meta-agents, the exact same problems of bias exist within the intermediaries' sub-structures. The issues with span of control compounds bias as information moves up, down, and across the system where information is intentionally and unintentionally manipulated. The final information available is merely a shell of the original truth.
Using intermediaries as a way to collect and process information about the human climate is fundamentally flawed as the use of intermediaries subjects the truth to the bias of the intermediary as an agent and meta-agent within the system. Despite these problems of bias, they have been the best tool available to military forces up until now to understand the human climate.
The next section will address how SOCMINT may provide an alternative to using intermediaries and how they can eliminate bias while improving understanding of the population.
Chapter 3: How Military Forces Can Use Social Media To Understand The Human Climate
Introduction
Military forces use of intermediaries to understand the population highlights two fundamental problems. Those problems are collection and processing of human climate data from a population spread across great distances in a manner that keeps that information current.
Intermediaries solved this problem for military forces because they could use their existing networks to collect and process data from their respective constituencies. By using only a handful of intermediaries and their separate constituencies, military forces have the ability to gain a comprehensive understanding of people within the operational environment and solved the two problems of collection and processing. Effectively, the military forces outsourced collection and processing to another agent in the complex system, but doing so corrupted the data.
Use of intermediaries creates a third problem to understanding. Intermediary bias compounds the difficulties of understanding the human climate within the operational environment. Intermediaries as agents and meta-agents corrupt the data they collected and processed as a result of their multiple roles and biases within the complex system. This bias leads to military forces having only a distorted understanding of the military environment as shaped through the biases of intermediaries. Military forces cannot eliminate the bias of intermediaries unless they are willing to deal with the problems of collection and processing, something that military forces are not currently equipped to do. SOCMINT can solve this dilemma for military forces by eliminating intermediary bias, while providing the architecture to both collect and process information in a way that military forces can use to understand the human climate. The next section will explain how SOCMINT addresses each one of these problems.
Eliminating Intermediary Bias
SOCMINT can provide an accurate understanding of the population within the operational environment through minimizing intermediary bias. Looking at the environment as a series of nested two-level games between intermediaries and their sub-meta-agents, eliminating bias requires collecting information directly from the principle level two agents, individuals within the environment. Anne-Marie Slaughter, a professor of international relations at Princeton, proposed that all the issues associated with the negotiations between level-one agents and leveltwo agents should be to directly negotiated with each other using informal networks. This would eliminate other level-two agents balanced against the win-sets available from level-one agents. Social Media platforms provide that informal network. By participating in the informal network of social media, military forces can gain direct access to data from individuals without having to utilize intermediaries as conduits of information. Eliminating the series of intermediaries between the population and military forces minimizes the bias of those intermediaries to shape the narrative. SOCMINT cannot completely eliminate intermediary bias in the system. These intermediaries have existing power structures and will want to have an impact on the environment, but will no longer have control over the individual narratives of the people as they once have had when they where the only channel of such information.
Solving the Collection Problem using Social Media
With bias minimized within the system, social media networks solve the problem of collection for military forces. Recall that the issue with collection is a problem related to manpower, distance and time; SOCMINT can address all these issues. Instead of outsourcing collection to intermediaries, military forces can use social media networks to outsource collection directly to the individuals in the environment. Individuals using social media accounts are essentially voluntarily reporting their opinions as opposed to having to be asked as in traditional collection methods eliminating the requirement for military forces to participate in the collection process at all. This self-reporting happens in the absence of military forces and the social media network itself becomes the larger database that stores these reports. In addition to storing the reports, the information is continually updated as individual's continually self-report eliminating issues of perishability associated with collecting climate data. It essentially automates collection; military forces only need to interact with the data when they are ready to process that data.
Data stored in social media networks consists not only of the self-report in the form of a status message, but also places that report within a wealth of relational data. Messages in social media networks lie within a complex web of user profiles, relationships, biographical information, geotagging (the location where the message was composed built into the message itself), historical reporting, and on and on. This wealth of relational data provides context for the message, but also the potential to process that message using any lens that military forces can think of to analyze the information through data-mining. Data mining describes an intelligence practice that looks for specific information within a mass of data using statistical analysis and search parameters to answer priority intelligence requirements. 60 Want to know what unemployed 18 year olds in eastern Baghdad who like military topics think about the operational environment? That data already exists in several social media networks, ready for processing.
There are two risks of outsourcing collection to individuals through social media networks. These risks are participation and accuracy. Will enough individuals participate in social media networks to give an accurate picture of the target population, and is the information they provide accurate?
The first risk is the issue of participation. Self-reporting is a function of access to the social media network and the choice to voluntarily self-report by using the social media network.
Access has long been a function of owning a PC, which has traditionally created a "DigitalDivide" between those with the education and funds to own a PC and the national infrastructure to support a large number of users. 61 This divide is closing with the increasing presence and access of internet across the globe. In addition, the ubiquitous presence of computers and Internet connections that makes access as easy as finding a place to log on; the networks are going mobile.
High data capacity cell networks have made the issue of access possible for anyone with a smart phone and signal. Access is not available everywhere, but it is constantly growing meaning that for many populations, access is either currently present, or will be soon. With access becoming near universal, the next issue is whether people will volunteer to participate, will users self-report 60 ADRP 2-0, 3-20.
61 Amir Hatem Ali, "The Power of Social Media in Developing Nations: New Tools for Closing the Global Digital Divide and Beyond," Harvard Human Rights Journal, Volume 24, Issue 1, (June, 2011), 197. through social media networks. Social media networks derive value in how well they encourage members to use them to share information and opinions. The structure of the network itself is optimized to make users want to participate. Looking at the growth of Twitter and Facebook, it is clear that these social media networks are effective at getting users to voluntarily participate in the network.
The second risk associated with using social-media networks is that since individuals voluntarily self-report there are potential issues with the accuracy of that information. Individuals are subject to all the same bias that intermediaries have as individual agents. Issues such as ideology, internal models, and self-preservation still exist within the individual, but due to a significantly larger sample size, the presence of these biases become statistically insignificant.
Unlike the intermediary who operates as one of only a handful of people that interact with military forces, the individual within the population is only one voice amongst hundreds of thousands and millions. Health care professionals have long used social media as a way to evaluate, track, and predict the spread of influenza.
62 By utilizing the larger sample size, any individual bias becomes statistically insignificant within the massive amount of data available to analyze. So while an individual report may be inaccurate, the overall reporting of all members of the population can make up for that inaccuracy through volume of more accurate reporting. In addition, the social aspect of the network provides another benefit. The relational information provides a way to evaluate the validity of a report based on its connections to other reports. In the case of influenza, the likelihood that a "tweet" about the flu is more likely to be true based on how many connected accounts also report about the flu. 63 It is more that just a large number of reports that make the tweet statistically significant, but the number of ties that reports have to Sentiment analysis analyzes the way in which people in the operational environment feel about the present, past and future. Specifically, "sentiment analysis is the process of determining and measuring the tone, attitude, opinion, and emotional state of responses.
64 " Since social media is a text-based platform, the words that people use on social media accounts, these words have degrees of intensity that statistical programs could measure. Words like good, bad, great, ok, and terrible are adjectives that describe the writer's intensity about how they feel about the subject within their sentence structure. Additionally, sentence structure includes tense, which describes whether the user is describing the subject in terms of the present, past, or future. Sentiment
analysis uses statistical models to analyze sentence structure of multiple social media messages within the context of time and intensity. As populations report more and more on their environment through social-media, there is a large amount of data available for sentiment analysis. During a visit to the United Services Automobile Association (USAA), the author was able to see how the company leverages sentiment analysis to track how people view their brand.
On a large wall, the company has what it calls its social media exchange, eight screens that monitor the brand on social media. One of the screens focuses on sentiment alone. On the screen are the name of USAA and other banks, each highlighted with a color ranging from green to red.
The color indicates the current sentiment of the brand on social media accounts. Through this analysis, the company can see how it is doing, and how it is doing with respect to competitors.
Military forces can use this analysis to understand to the degree that the population feels about events in the past, present, or future and make decisions based on this complete understanding of sentiment within the operational environment.
Co 
Conclusion
This monograph demonstrates how social media can provide a better understanding of the population in the operational environment. In particular, it addresses three key problems in the current operational environment: collection, processing, and intermediary bias. Understanding the population has always been limited by the constraints of collection and processing. Military forces lack the capacity to collect and process large amounts of information spread across vast distances on a continuous basis. Due to the problems of dealing with a vast amount of data, military forces have outsourced collecting and processing information about the population to intermediaries that have their own networks to collect information from their sphere of influence.
Unfortunately, while the use of intermediaries has addressed the problems of collection and processing it has created a third problem, intermediary bias. Consciously and unconsciously, intermediaries allow bias to creep into their assessment of the population due to their roles and agents and meta-agents within the complex system that is the operational environment.
SOCMINT provides an opportunity to minimize the presence of bias of intermediaries by collecting information directly from the people in the environment through social networks.
Leveraging these social networks, SOCMINT can use the power of computing to solve the problems of collection and processing information directly from the population. Using the information available and new analytical tools, military forces now have the potential to gain a better, unbiased understanding of the population in the operational environment.
While this research presents the problems of using intermediaries and how SOCMINT can overcome the problems of bias, collection, and processing, there is much potential to further this research through application. Military forces in operational environments should leverage social media analytical tools to better understand the people within their operational environment.
Military forces can easily incorporate social media analysis into existing force structures through the purchasing of social-media analysis tool-kits and training a small cell of four people within the intelligence company at the brigade and higher levels. A team of four soldiers would be able to provide twenty-four hour support to brigade operations. From humanitarian operations to COIN environments, military forces should look to social media and incorporate that information into a better understanding of the population within the operational environment.
A war amongst the people can occur as a result of both conventional and unconventional warfare. To operate in this environment, commanders and staffs must gain an understanding about the needs, wants, and desires of the population within the environment. Current challenges of understanding the human climate within the operational environment drives military forces to outsource the problems of collection and processing to intermediaries. Outsourcing these tasks subjects the data to bias that intermediaries have as agents and meta-agents resulting in military forces receiving a corrupted perception about the human climate potentially leading to making bad decisions. Social media and SOCMINT can overcome those biases by eliminating intermediaries, while providing a framework that supports the collection and processing of data directly from the population to support military force decision-making processes.
